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Abstract 
   This paper examined how and the extent to which human capital 
and social trust are associated with the learning process of a manager in 
making operations decisions through experience.  To this end, using a data 
set originally and purposively constructed by the author, I investigate the 
development and transformation of the garment industry cluster region of 
Kojima, Japan.  The major findings through statistical estimations are as 
follows.  (1) In the cluster development stage, the social trust of an 
enterprise and its manager ‟s experiences in firm operations could be 
regarded as forming a complimentary association.  (2) In the stage following 
cluster development, however, a manager ‟s human capital as accumulated 
through schooling and personal experience becomes complimentary instead 
of social trust.   
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1. Introduction 
 
  It is widely and generally acknowledged that the improvement of individual 
faculties through past experiences plays a critical role in economic development (Shultz, 
1975).  Existing literature applies the Bayesian learning process, in which previous 
decisions and outcomes provide new information and thereby improve decisions, to 
theoretically clarify the accumulation of human capital (Jovanovic and Nyarko 1996).   
There has recently been growing interest in such leaning mechanisms from the 
empirical point of view, and hence a growing number of studies have attempted to 
explore the developmental process based upon this learning model (Munshi 2004; 
Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Goux and Maurin 2007; Yamauchi 2004 )1.  On the other 
hand, school education, which generates human capital, has also convincingly been 
argued as an important factor of economic development (Yamamura et al. 2003).  
Although, roughly speaking, both leaning and schooling can be thought of as making 
great contributions to the accumulation of human capital, their features and functions 
cannot be considered the same indiscriminately.  Accordingly, the effects of human 
capital on economic development should be divided twofold.    
A number of crucial notions concerning interpersonal relations, such as social trust, 
social norms, and reputation, have been increasingly explored in the fields of economics 
and sociology (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Coleman 1990; Fukuyama 1995; 
Granovetter 1985; Kandori, 1992; Sugden 1989; Putnam 1993, 2000; Vega-Redondo 
2006; Yamagishi et al. 1998).  These notions are formed as a consequence of long term 
and intense personal interaction, especially within a community formed as a 
long-established and closely knitted group.  For instance, under conditions such as 
communities in developing countries where the market is still far from perfect and 
therefore does not sufficiently function, and where formal legal institutions have not yet 
been established, social trust among community members plays a relatively important 
role in mitigating problems caused by market imperfection and the scarcity of formal 
institutions (Hayami 1995).  In order to assess the role of mutual trust, merchant trade 
has been explored using available historical evidence from the medieval era (Greif, 
1994), and empirical case studies have been conducted in modern developing countries 
(Banarjee and Duflo 2000; Banarjee and Munshi 2004; McMillan and Woodruff 1999).  
Previous literature also provides evidence, using cross-country data, that social trust 
and social capital play a significant role in realizing high economic performance (e.g., 
                                                   
1 In particular, technology diffusion is examined within the learning mechanism 
framework. 
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Hall and Jones 1999; Knack 2003; Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001)2.  
However, it has also been observed that social capital failed to cause economic 
development (Miguel et al. 2005).  These ostensibly conflicting findings imply that the 
role of social trust in economic development ,may change over time. This is the focus of 
the current study. 
Learning processes, social trust and schooling are considered to not only make a 
great contribution to economic development independently but also interact with each 
other to become the engine of development.  To take an example, the complementary 
relationship between schooling and learning processes has been empirically explored 
(Rosenzweig 1995; Yamauchi 2004). These studies analyzed how schooling enhances the 
effects of learning, thereby improving the precision of decision making.  Such research, 
however, puts focus upon only one phase of the developmental process and therefore 
does not examine how the association between schooling and learning processes 
changes over time from the viewpoint of long-term processes.  For this purpose, an 
empirical approach using data covering a long period of time is necessary.  On the 
other hand, although it is also necessary to investigate the association between 
socio-economic factors such as social trust and learning processes, few studies have been 
conducted to date3.  Accordingly, I am concerned in this paper with the question of how 
the associations between schooling, social trust and leaning processes evolve and how 
their interactions influence economic development.  To accomplish this, I examine the 
long term development process of the Kojima region, the largest garment industry 
cluster in Japan. 
Although at one time the Kojima region had scarce arable land was a relatively less 
developed area, rapid economic growth occurred due to the emergence of garment 
clusters in the post-war period.  More recently, however, the amount of output within 
the Kojima region has decreased because of the relocation of production to regions 
outside Kojima.  The Kojima region experienced considerable change in the post-war 
period.  For these reasons, the Kojima region is an appropriate target for investigating 
the different phases of the development process.  Although I make use of available 
published production data at the enterprise level for selected years covering a span of 
about 40 years, there are limitations preventing a sufficiently thorough investigation of 
the development process in detail.  To compensate for this, I also conducted a number 
                                                   
2 Hall and Jones (1999) constructed an index of „social infrastructure‟ instead of the 
generalized concepts of trust or social capital. 
3 Foster and Resenzweig (1995) indicated that information spillover is promoted by 
learning effects through interaction among neighbors, leading to a rise in agricultural 
productivity. 
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of reconnaissance and field research trips to Kojima to collect original survey data from 
existing enterprises.  Such data comprised of published and original survey data 
allows me to provide an empirical assessment of the effects schooling and social trust 
have on the learning process. 
  The organization of this paper is as follows:  Section 2 provides a simple 
economic model on which the empirical analysis is based, and then postulates a testable 
hypothesis.  A brief description of the data collection is presented and the 
developmental process of the Kojima region during the past 40 years is overviewed in 
Section 3.  Section 4 presents a regression model and discusses the results of the 
estimations.  The final section offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Basic empirical model 
   In this paper, social trust formed by long-term interpersonal interaction is 
considered to play an important role on how firms invest 4 .  I assume that the 
production function takes the form of the target input model and apply the model 
employed in the existing literature to this research (Wilson 1975; Jovanovic and Nyarko 
1994; Rosenzweig 1995; Bardhan and Udry 1999; Yamauchi 2001).  The main feature 
of the target input model is that an agent such as a firm manager determines the input 
after obtaining the relevant information, yielded by experience, about the optimal input.  
A risk neutral agent j that is taken as a manager can produce goods at period t.  Input 
and output levels are denoted as zjt and qjt , respectively.  The production function is 
defined as 
2)(1)1( jtjtjt zyqa  , 
where 
jtjjt wyb )1(   
is a random target that fluctuates around parameter θj  representing the ability of j.  
wjt is an i.i.d. normal variate with a mean of zero and variance of σ2w..  A firm 
manager knowsσ2w..  Hence, he does not observeθj directly, but rather has some 
prior beliefs about it.  E(·)t and var t (·) denote the conditional expectation and 
conditional variance at t , respectively.  The optimal decision and the resulting 
expected output are  
                                                   
4 Putnam (1993) asserts that social capital as presented in the case of Italy is 
considered to consist of local public goods.  Following this argument, here social trust is 
taken as local public goods. 
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)()()2( jtjttjt EyEza  , 
2)(var1)()2( wjtjtt qEb   . 
  In each period t, a firm manager can obtain information and then decide the input 
level zjt, which is equivalent to E(θj).  Then, this process of decision making related to 
production is repeated.  That is, a manager produces a good at t and then at the end of 
period t observes yjt, thereby updating the prior variance concerning the optimal output 
level.  Further, ρ0 =1/var0(θj) is assumed to be the level of precision of a manager‟s 
expectation before starting production.  ρl=1/σ2w. is the level of precision after 
obtaining the information through the previous experience of production. According to 
the Bayesian model, vart(θj) is represented as  
ljt
jt
N 



0
1
)(var)3( . 
Njt denotes the number of productions manager j has experienced at period t.   
Et (q) can thus be rewritten as  
2
0
1
1)()4( w
ljt
jtt
N
qE 



 . 
Here, let us assume that local capital plays a critical role in a limited area while 
global capital plays an important role in an unlimited area.  For instance, the 
number of years of operation of a firm located in a suburban cluster has been taken 
as a proxy for local capital (social trust)5.  A firm with a greater number of years of 
operation has survived for a longer period, indicating its superiority and sustainable 
good business relationships within its business partners of the same cluster, which 
further add to the firm‟s reputation6.  As a consequence, community members are more 
likely to trust a firm of longer standing.  On the other hand, the human capital 
accumulated by school education is thought to be unlimited to a particular area, and 
therefore it can be the proxy for global capital.  Both of local and global capital 
affect productivity through the improvement of the precision of expectations7.  
Accordingly, ρ0=ρ0 (L, G), ρl=ρl (L, G), where L and G are the local and the global 
                                                   
5 McMillan and Woodruff (1999) use duration of trading relationship as a proxy for the 
degree of reliability.  
6 As discussed later, prior to the 1980s production was mostly conducted within the 
Kojima region, regarded as a garment cluster.  Business partners were thus almost 
exclusively local community members. 
7 The arguments of the existing literature are similar with this research in assuming 
that the precision of expectations depends upon school education (Rosenzweig 1995; 
Yamauchi 2001); they do not consider how social trust affects precision. 
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capital, respectively.  Furthermore, referring to the developing phase and the 
developed phase in the developmental process as Phase A and Phase B, respectively, 
I consider the effect of local and global capital upon learning.  I also assume that 
the features of local capital and global capital for Phase A are the opposite in Phase 
B.    
 
Phase A 
In the developing phase, firms are thought to tend to produce goods in a limited 
area.  Firms with larger local capital, hence, would be more able to access the 
available information when they start business.  Accordingly, these firms can 
improve their precision of expectation.  Further, having larger local capital enables 
firms to understand informal local rules more accurately and deeply8.  These firms 
end up learning to follow the local rules since they can calculate the cost caused by 
suffering ostracism if they violate them.  Consequently, firms initially deal with 
other local firms repeatedly, thereby strengthening their business connections 
within the local community.  As a result, these firms are expected to gradually 
economize their transaction costs to improve performance.  That is, the repeating 
of production and business transactions seems to improve the precision of 
expectation.  Thus, the following assumption can be presented. 
(Assumption 1)    00 


L

, 0


L
l  
Under a condition where an agent is constrained by local rules, global capital does 
not affect access to information.  Hence, global capital makes only a minimal 
contribution to the improvement of the precision of expectation.  In addition, global 
rules have an effect upon the extent to which an agent understands the generalized 
rules that are not limited to within a community, while not affecting the degree of 
understanding about local rules.  Accordingly, an agent with greater global capital 
is expected to engage in more optimal behavior, which is not constrained by local 
rules.  This might be why agents in such a condition have a greater tendency to 
engage in behaviors against the local rules, and as a result become more likely to 
suffer ostracism by the local community members.  Once an agent has suffered 
ostracism and lost local trust, it is very difficult to rebuild cooperative relationships 
with business partners within the local community.  Inevitably, the experiences of 
agents with global capital results in a deterioration of the precision of expectation.  
I thus provide the following assumption. 
                                                   
8 Kandori (1992) defines such a local rule as the social norm. 
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(Assumption 2)   00 


G

, 0


G
l  
In this case, theorem (1A) is postulated as below.  
 
Theorem (1A) 
(1) The larger the local capital, the larger the expected yield becomes. 
 (2) The larger the amount of production, the larger the expected yield becomes. 
(3) If l  is sufficiently small, the larger the local capital and the more one 
experiences production, the larger the expected yield becomes9.  
 
(Proof) 
Differentiating the expected yield with respect to the local capital, 
0
)(
)(
)(
2
0
0
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






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
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

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Differentiating the expected yield with respect to amount of production 
experience, 
 0
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Further, differentiating equation (i) with respect to jtN , 
0
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))(()(2
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
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ⅲ . 
From (i)(ii), (1) and (2) hold.  From (iii), (3) holds.     Q.E.D. 
 
Under the same assumption, theorem (1B), concerning global capital, can be 
derived.  The proof of this theorem is obtained by the same procedure as theorem 
(1A), differentiating (i) and (iii) with respect to G instead of L.  
 
Theorem (1B) 
                                                   
9 The condition thatσ2w. be sufficiently small appears to be pertinent to developing 
countries that envisage similar drastic economic change.  Hence, the assumption that 
ρt=1/σ2w. is small enough seems convincing.  On the other hand, Jovanovic and Nyarko 
(1996) focused on the degree of ρ0, which determines the choice of technology and 
thereby also economic growth. 
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(1) The larger the global capital, the smaller the expected yield becomes. 
 (2) The larger the amount of production, the larger the expected yield becomes. 
(3) If l  is sufficiently small, the larger the global capital and the more one 
experiences production, the smaller the expected yield becomes.  
 
Phase B 
As the cluster develops, the location of production tends to move toward the 
outside of the community.  Hence, a firm is less constrained by local rules, and 
global capital begins to play a critical role in enhancing production.  This is 
because local capital increases the effects of learning through production experience.  
On the other hand, a firm with larger local capital that is strongly trusted by its 
business partners within the community is more likely to continue to conduct 
business in the same manner, with the aim of maintaining its business 
relationships formed through long-term transactions.  Due to this inertia, that is, 
path dependence, such a firm has presumably more difficulty in relocating its 
production base towards the outside of the cluster.  Under this condition, a firm 
locally trusted among community members seems to have fewer learning effects 
from the experience of moving production outside of the community, because the 
local rules that has been thus far obeyed by the firm are not formerly or generally 
recognized, and as such not equivalent to the general rules.  This may be why the 
effects of local capital and global capital on expected yield are thought to be opposed 
in Phase A10.  Hence, assumptions 3 and 4 of Phase B are completely opposite those 
of Phase A:     
 
(Assumption3)      00 


G

, 0


G
l  
(Assumption4)    00 


L

, 0


L
l  
Then, the following theorems are obtained in the same way as the previously 
presented proof.  
 
Theorem (2A) 
(1) The larger the global capital, the larger the expected yield becomes. 
                                                   
10 Fafchamps argued that trust can be categorized into generalized trust and 
personalized trust and that generalized trust yields more efficient outcomes than 
personalized trust (Fafchamps 2006).  Local capital (social trust) as defined in this 
paper is more equivalent to personalized trust rather than to generalized trust.   
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(2) The larger the amount of production, the larger the expected yield becomes. 
(3) If l  is sufficiently small and the global capital large, then the amount of 
production experience increases the expected yield.  
Theorem (2B) 
(1) The larger the local capital, the smaller the expected yield becomes. 
 (2) The larger the amount of production, the larger the expected yield becomes. 
(3) If l  is sufficiently small and the local capital large, then the amount of  
production experience decreases the expected yield.  
 
Summing up the discussion presented thus far in this section, in the developing 
stage where the market does not yet sufficiently function, the social trust among 
community members plays an important role.  This stage corresponds to Phase A, 
in which social trust is considered to comprise local public goods (Hayami 2001).  
Within the community, which is not open to the outside world, there are social 
norms taken as rules locally formed.  If a community member violates these norms, 
they will suffer from ostracism even if their actions are based on rational behavior 
without community-based constraints (Greif 1994; Kandori 1992; Hayami 2001).  
On the other hand, one can accumulate global and generalized knowledge through 
formal school education, which appears to be irrelevant to social norms.  Therefore, 
school education might have a detrimental effect rather than a positive effect upon 
the updating of the precision of expectation.  
When an economy develops and enters the stage where the market mechanism 
comes to function well, the importance of school education increases with respect to 
dealing with strangers. At this „developed‟ stage, which corresponds to Phase B, 
economic activity extends from within a community toward the world outside.  As 
a result of this change, one can do business more efficiently outside of the 
community even when suffering from ostracism inside the community.  Accordingly, 
a firm manager is able to make optimal decisions without the constraints of local 
rules11.  Herein, although school education is predicted to improve the precision of 
expectation, the social trust within a community prevents a manager from coping 
with the change of economic circumstance swiftly, despite playing the important 
role at the local level.12  The following empirical hypotheses are therefore raised in 
                                                   
11 Greif (1994) uses commercial transactions among Mediterranean traders in the 
medieval age to suggest how institutions shifted from transaction relations based upon 
informal rules to those based on formal rules.  
12 The reason why human capital has a positive effect upon production is because under 
circumstances in which an economy has matured and the market has come to expand 
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order to examine the theorems and conjectures presented thus far.  
 
Hypothesis 1 
In the developing stage, the association of social trust and manager experience is 
complementary when managers operate production.  Subsequently, in the 
developed stage, this association becomes substitute.    
 
Hypothesis 2 
In the developing stage, the association of school education and manager 
experience is substitute when managers operate production.  Subsequently, in the 
developed stage, this association becomes complementary.    
 
3. Overview of the garment cluster in Kojima 
 
3.1. Data sources and collection 
The firm level data used in this paper to perform the empirical analysis is composed 
of both officially published data and original survey data collected from each target firm. 
The officially published data source is the Manual of Enterprises in the Textile 
Industries: Volume for Western Japan [Zenkoku Sen-i Kigyou Yoran by Shin-yo Kokan 
Jo (1970-2006)]. This source provides data on total revenue (including revenue 
generated from production outside the Kojima cluster), a brief history of each enterprise, 
and a biographical sketch of the enterprise managers including their education history 
and birth place.  The Manual, however, does not include the decomposed revenues 
generated from production in Kojima and other areas.  The data reconnaissance was 
conducted in 2004 in order to better analyze the overall patterns of development and the 
transformation of the Kojima garment cluster.  Subsequently, for the purpose of 
obtaining additional supplementary information covering an approximately 40-year 
period including the years 1968, 1978, 1988, 1998, and 2005, surveys of about 40 
                                                                                                                                                     
and diversify, the features of human capital are more smoothly adapted to the changes 
in economic conditions and have greater technological externality than the features of 
social trust.  Considering only technological externality, however, cannot fully account 
for why social trust also has a detrimental effect.  In order to explain the reason why 
social trust and human capital come to have opposite effects in the long term 
developmental process, the following factors should be analyzed: (1) Business 
relationships should be considered from the viewpoint of industrial organization; for 
instance, the transaction cost for subcontracting seems to affect economic performance. 
(2) The relative importance of capital changes when technology changes (Salvanes and 
Tveteras 2004).  The social norm becomes “the vintage capital,” and thus decreases 
efficiency due to changes in the economic circumstances.  
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existing firms were carried out in 2005 and 2006.    
Before turning to a description of the data, I briefly describe the sampling 
procedure employed in the 2005 and 2006 surveys.  The survey was conducted in 
collaboration with the Association of the Garment Industry in Oakayama prefecture, 
which provided a member list of 107 registered firms.  Although there were a large 
number of unregistered firms, I believe that the registered firms are representative of 
the firms in the Kojima cluster because the list covers the various types of firms, as 
described in detail later.  Given my resource constraints, I was unable to conduct a 
census of the entire Kojima cluster, which would have allowed me to randomly sample 
firms from this list for the survey.  The survey took a month to complete, and 
information was collected from 35 firms.  In the process of collecting the questionnaires, 
I conducted informal interviews with about 40 enterprise managers.  While the main 
limitation of the dataset is its relatively small sample size, it also has the advantage of 
making possible an assessment of the changing importance of social trust and human 
capital in the developmental process of the garment cluster.  
 
3.2.  Brief history  
The setting for the empirical analysis is the town of Kojima, Japan.  As shown in 
Figure 1, Kojima is located in Okayama prefecture, in western Japan, facing the Setonai 
Sea and surrounded by mountains, leading to a scarcity of arable land.  In addition to 
these factors, the amount of rainfall is not high, resulting in low agricultural yields and 
a comparative advantage for non-agricultural sectors.  The Kojima region used to be 
known as a textile-producing cluster during the 17 and 19 centuries, that is, during the 
Edo and Meiji periods, and then it became known for producing tabi (Japanese 
traditional socks made of fabric) in the early 20th century, i.e., during the Taisho period 
(Tawada 1957).  Subsequently, using existing technology of tabi production, the Kojima 
region began producing clothes and then eventually emerged as the main cluster of 
school uniform production.  Prior to World War II, the share of school uniform and 
work clothes production in Kojima reached 85 % of all domestic production in Japan 
(Tawada 1957).   
In the post-war period, especially during the 1950s, many firms entered the 
garment industry, with the number of garment firms surpassing 100 (San-yo 
Newspaper Publishing 1977).  The production share of school uniforms and work 
clothes of the Kojima region continued to be the highest in Japan (Yamamura et al. 
2003).  The increase in the number of garment firms resulted in an upsurge of 
competition among them.  In addition, the major textile firms supplying materials for 
 11 
school uniform production began restricting their business partners to large firms, 
leading to the drastic grouping of enterprises.  Small scale firms thus became unable to 
purchase textiles, causing them to cease production of school uniforms. Subsequently 
they were pressured to exit the market (Kakuta 1971).  Such drastic changes in the 
business environment caused firms to be excluded from the major business groups and 
seek „niche markets‟ in which there seemed to be latent demand13.  For example, some 
small firms attempted to enter the market for jeans and „office lady‟ uniforms, markets 
that emerged mainly due to the socio-economic changes stemming from the inflow of 
western culture in the post-war period.  The managers who decided to enter niche 
markets were considered „entrepreneurs‟ and triggered economic development through 
innovation (Shumpeter 1912).  As a consequence, the Kojima region came to be very 
famous for not only school uniforms and work clothes but also jeans and office lady 
uniforms. 
According to the interview data, in the 1960s young and skilled labor resources 
were abundant in the Kojima region, not only from the local Kojima town but also from 
the surrounding rural areas of the Kyushu and Shikoku islands14.  Such a seemingly 
„unlimited‟ supply of cheap labor was no longer available in the 1970s.  Hence, in order 
to continue to enjoy a cheap labor force, the garment firms of the Kojima region began to 
rely on subcontract firms outside of Kojima and the establishment of branch factories 
and subsidiaries mainly in the Kyushu and Shikoku islands.  Subsequently, since the 
beginning of 1990, although the much lower wages and the considerable improvement of 
worker skills available through China producers have been an attractive option for 
many of the Kojima firms, the actual transfer of production bases to China has yet to 
commence due to the unique characteristics of the Kojima region clothes firms, which 
are discussed in the following sub-section15.  In either case, the shift of production 
bases over a span of more than 30 years is shown in Figure 2, which depicts the changes 
in proportion of sales revenue generated by Kojima region firms, despite the sales likely 
being to other parts of Japan rather than abroad.  Figure 2 reveals that the ratio of 
production taking place in the Kojima region was about 60% in 1968, but then declined 
                                                   
13 Kunio Ohshima, the founder of „Betty Smith,‟ known as the first to specially produce 
ladies‟ jeans, expressed during an interview that the Tokyo Olympics held in 1964 were 
an epoch-making event that appeared to raise the demand for Western clothes such as 
jeans.   
14 A similar pattern was also observed in the Bingo region, which was a major garment 
cluster second only to the Kojima region (Yamamura et al. 2003).   
15 According to my interviews, although some firms that were mainly work clothes 
producers relocated their production bases to China, these cases were relatively 
uncommon within the Kojima region. 
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steadily over time to less than 20% in 2005.  This indicates that whereas production 
was previously mainly based upon business relationships within the community, the 
importance of community based business networks decreased remarkably over time. 
 
3.3.  Characteristics of clothes and production systems 
     Although there have been various kinds of clothes produced in the Kojima region, 
its firms can be roughly categorized into two types in terms of the kinds of clothes they 
produce: school uniform producers and jeans producers.  As mentioned previously, the 
former is regarded as a traditionally produced type of clothes while the latter is 
regarded as a new type of clothes introduced by innovative managers.  Generally 
speaking, garment production is organized in a large number of stages. The 
fundamental stages are knitting, cutting, and stitching.  Additional stages also become 
important depending upon the kinds of clothes and quality of product, because rises in 
income levels during the process of economic development cause consumers to demand 
more fashionable and refined clothes than before.  Accordingly, the roles played by 
stages such as dyeing, calendaring and printing can become critical in determining how 
and the extent to which products are fashionable and meet consumer demand. This was 
especially true after the mid-1980s.   
Although the school uniform, by definition, does not vary for one school, there is 
remarkable variation in uniforms among schools.  According to my interview data, the 
educational market has become very competitive, leading schools to differentiate their 
school uniforms from others with the aim of recruiting more students.  Indeed, these 
days there are even school uniforms designed by prominent designers, such as Hanae 
Mori.  As for jeans, production it is characterized by the various special stages involved, 
such as washing, blustering, damaging and remaking, all of which require a certain 
degree of skilled labor that is generally centered in the cluster of production (Marshall, 
1920).  Firms are expected to enjoy agglomeration economies in response to changing 
demand for their products by using experienced, high skilled labor.  However, contrary 
to this expectation, in actuality firms tended to shift their production base to areas 
outside of Kojima, as shown in Figure 2.   
Here it is necessary to deal carefully with production systems.  Figure 3, 
showing changes in proportion produced by internal production, indicates that the 
internal production ratio declined from slightly less than 90% in the 1960s to about 60% 
in the 1980s and then was stable until 2005.  From the data in Figures 2 and 3, I 
derived the argument that firms continued to mainly rely upon internal production 
rather than other means such as subcontracting, which would have involved shifting 
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the production base outside of the Kojima region.  This is presumably because the 
transaction costs between makers and subcontractors are more apt to increase due to 
the increasing difficulty in checking product quality in advance under conditions where 
the quality of products must improve while their diversity increases.  Further, 
transaction costs are higher when the locations of subcontractors are distant from their 
subcontracting firms compared to when they are near.  This implies that location and 
the internal structure of production seems to be determined jointly in order to minimize 
total costs.  
     The school uniform is characterized as a package order on a massive scale 
originating from newly registered students when the Japanese new school year begins 
every April.  In the case of Japan, makers start production after receiving orders from 
those students who successfully passed the entrance examinations, which are ordinarily 
held in February.  Then there is a need to deliver the products in time for the entrance 
ceremony in April.  Thus, at most it can take no more than two months to complete 
such large-scale orders for incoming students.  In reality, however, school uniform 
makers can to a certain extent calculate the expected quantity of orders in advance and 
therefore begin production of the normal sizes, even if there are subsequent variations 
in the orders from small to large sizes.   However, there still remains the possibility of 
orders from „outliers‟, i.e., those who require extremely large or small sizes.  Hence 
firms must confront uncertainty and are thus required to flexibly and promptly deal 
with irregular orders.  In sum, it is necessary for school uniform makers to achieve  
punctual delivery while at the same time dealing with irregular orders flexibly and 
promptly.  Such conditions are also considered to raise transaction costs, and thus 
firms tend to take advantage of internal production resources with the aim of 
economizing transaction costs.    
     
3.4 . Initial economic conditions and changes in the roles of social trust and 
human capital. 
  
Now let us consider how the situation of the Kojima garment cluster is relevant to 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, which are derived from the simple theoretical model described in  
Section 2.  As mentioned previously, the Kojima region has the unique geographical 
features of being surrounded by mountains and the sea.  Further, prior to the advent of 
modern transportation, such as railways or automobiles, the inflow of strangers from 
outside the Kojima region was limited; the Kojima community was considered to be a 
closed society.  Local norms were likely formed independent of the outside world due to 
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scarce contact with the outside.  In this research, the local norm is defined as the local 
rule in the closed community.  That is to say, local rules are limited within a 
community but not followed in the outside world 16 .  Local rules are based on 
conventions, which is judged from the inside of the community, not the outside (Sugden 
1989).  Compared to these local rules, rules that are not limited to a particular area are 
called global rules. 
According to field research conducted in the Bingo region, which is also a major 
garment cluster in Japan, a trading company employee doing business with a Bingo 
partner said ‟It is impossible to do business unless one enters the Bingo region and 
becomes well acquainted with its culture and history‟ (Yamamura 2005).  My field 
research for the current study indicates that the Kojima region is similar to the Bingo 
area on this point.  This presumably is why one must have much knowledge about the 
business conventions of a particular region in order to enter smoothly into business 
relationships.  These business conventions, which cannot exist in the market in the 
sense of neoclassical economics, formed gradually though long-term and intensive 
personal interactions.  These local rules and norms based on conventions obviously 
differ from rules of transaction generally recognized by trading company employees.  
As such, knowledge about local rules and norms cannot be obtained through school 
education.  For instance, there is the case of a manager born in the Bingo community 
who graduated from a prestigious university in Tokyo but failed in business after 
returning to the Bingo region in the 1960s and 1970s (Yamamura 2005).  Yamamura 
(2005) indicated through his interview that this manager ‟s failure might have been due 
to the fact that he was unable to sufficiently understand the local rules in the long run 
despite his great business knowledge and ability.  I also observed a similar case in the 
Kojima region through my field research.  Taken together, the above facts suggest that 
local rules exist in the Kojima region. 
Though local rules seemingly have a detrimental effect upon a firm‟s performance, 
they also are considered to make a contribution to the firm from a different viewpoint. 
The Ozaki Shoji corporation is well-known as a very successful and long-standing firm, 
established in 1929.  It seems to be plausibly argued that it takes long time for a firm 
to establish social trust as a brand and a good reputation through repetitive 
transactions.  Ozaki Shoji seems to have been able to form social trust within the 
Kojima region through long term business relations with the subcontractors and 
wholesalers of the Kojima region.  Fusajiro Ozaki, who was the manager of Ozaki Shoji 
                                                   
16 Local rules provide various types of contracts, such as the commercial contracts and 
contracts between makers and subcontractors. 
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as well as chairman of the Association of the Garment Industry of Japan, was honored 
by not only employees of Ozaki Shoji but also individuals involved in the garment 
industry and residents of the Kojima community17.  This is because he worked not only 
for Ozaki Shoji but also for the good of the local community.  He often took part in 
various meetings and become a man of influence in the Kojima region.  On the other 
hand, Fusajiro Ozaki also played a substantial role in the steadily growing the Ozaki 
Shoji business for more than 30 years from the beginning of the 1950s to the mid-1980s.  
It follows from this that one of the main reasons for the growth and dominance of Ozaki 
Shoji is because Fusajiro Ozaki was well acquainted with the local rules, and he took 
advantage of the social trust Ozaki Shoji generated since being established in Kojima.  
Following the discussion above, it seems that it was very difficult for outsiders 
whose home town was not Kojima to do business smoothly in its relatively closed area.  
But just how different are the ways of doing business between the home town, or native, 
managers born in Kojima and the outsiders?  Because I am particularly interested in 
comparing the locations of the production bases and production systems of firms 
managed by native managers with those managed by outsiders, the sample is divided 
according to the hometown of the managers, as shown in Table 118.  The numbers in 
parentheses, indicating the actual number of observations, indicates that the number of 
native managers is distinctly larger than that of outsider managers.   
Since the sample size is relatively small, I have decided to combine my survey data 
for 1968 and 1978, which are regarded as the developing stage years, and that for 1988, 
1998 and 2006, which are regarded as the developed stage.  I begin with the rates of 
production in the Kojima region in the left part of Table 1.  The rates of production in 
Kojima in the developing stage were higher than that in the developed stage for both 
the native Kojima managers and the outsider managers.  This rate of native mangers 
is higher than that of the outsider managers in the developing stage, but it becomes 
roughly the same in the developed stage.  As has been demonstrated in studies of the 
garment cluster in India, native managers seem to have much stronger social ties 
within a cluster compared to outsider managers (Banerjee and Munshi 2004).  The fact 
that the Kojima native managers have social connections with those with whom they 
work might have made it easier for them to do business with a large number of 
subcontractors inside the Kojima region during the developing stage.  This might be 
why the Kojima native managers tended to produce their products within the Kojima 
                                                   
17 Toshiaki Motoyama, the executive director of the Association of the Garment 
Industry in Okayama Prefecture, told me the story about Fusajiro Ozaki.  
18 According to my interviews, some managers were born outside of the Kojima region 
and thus are defined as outsiders in Kojima. 
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region using subcontractors, a conclusion consistent with the fact that the rate of 
internal production of the Kojima native managers was lower than that of the outsider 
managers in the developing stage, as shown in the right part of Table 1.   
Subsequently, when Kojima firms were confronted with the abovementioned 
business environment changes in the developed stage, the Kojima native managers 
were forced to shift their production bases to outside of the region, leading to the 
production rates of their firms in Kojima to be comparable to those of the outsider 
managers.  In the developed stage, when the quality upgrade of products took place, 
calling for a larger number of product stages and more skilled labor, it seems to have 
become very difficult to manage subcontractors due to the lack of social ties in the 
remote locations of the subcontractors and the lack of experienced labor, resulting in 
cost increases.  Therefore, internal products seem to have become relatively more 
important in raising firm performance than before.  From the right part of Table 1, it 
can be seen that the internal product rate of the native managers became higher than 
that of the outsider managers in the developed stage, despite being lower in the former 
stage.  This implies that native managers are more likely to produce higher quality 
products than outsider managers in response to the rising demand for a larger variety 
of fashionable and high quality clothes.     
In the early stages of cluster development, most production is conducted within 
the cluster.  As the cluster enters later stages of development, production bases tend to 
shift to outside areas.  As shown in Figure 2, this process is observed in the case of the 
Kojima garment cluster.  My conjecture is as follows: local rules had a significant effect 
within the Kojima cluster, such that firms with greater local capital such as social trust 
were able to carry out higher levels of output in the early stage of development.  In the 
subsequent stage, however, firms were not as constrained by local rules and hence 
global capital, such as human capital, rather than social trust came to make a greater 
contribution to the level of output. 
 
4. Empirical estimation  
In this section I estimate the determinants of firm size from 1968 to 2005 in terms 
of sales revenue in order to test the Hypotheses presented thus far19.  Then, 2SLS 
estimation, in which I use the instrumental variables to obtain the predicted values of 
endogenous independent variables, is employed to control for the problem of 
                                                   
19 This paper follows the same line of reasoning as existing literature (Hall and Jones 
1997; Banerjee and Munshi 2004), where the level of output is considered to represent 
economic performance. 
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endogeneity.  
  
4.1. Empirical strategy 
Following the assumption of Yamamura et al. (2003) that the size of a firm is a 
reasonable indicator of firm performance, I specified the following regression 
equation20:  
 
Ln(FSIZE) it= 0 + 1 Ln(TRUST)it +2Ln(HC)it +3 Ln(EXPE)it  
+4Ln(TRUST)it*Ln(EXPE)it+5Ln(HC)it*Ln(EXPE)it+6Ln(TRUST)it*Ln(HC)it 
+7Ln(TRUST)it*Ln(EXPE)it*Y6878+8Ln(HC)it*Ln(EXPE)it*Y6878 
+9Ln(TRUST)it*Ln(HC)it*Y6878+10CLUSTERit +11INTERit-+εi +ωit , 
 
where TRUST represents the rate of trust in prefecture i in year t, and ‟s represents 
the regression parameters. εi represents the unobservable firm-specific effects of i„s 
firm (a fixed effect firm vector )21. ωit represents the error term.  Fixed effects 
estimation is employed in order to control for unobserved individual effects using panel 
data (Baltagi 1995).  Labor, capital, and input, which are taken as production factors, 
can not be captured due to data limitations, and thus the risk of estimation bias is big.  
In order to attenuate this bias, the unobserved firm fixed effects are controlled for.   
Log of Firm Size, denoted as Ln(FSIZE ), is the dependent variable determined 
by various factors captured by the independent variables, as described below 22 .  
Following the discussion in Section 2, the years of operation of a firm since its 
establishment, TRUST, is incorporated as a proxy for social trust (local capital).   A 
manager‟s years of schooling, HC, is considered to represent human capital (global 
capital).  Years of experience as manager, EXPE, is thought to represent the learning 
effect of being a manager23.  FSIZE, TRUST, HC, and EXPE take log form and hence 
the coefficients of TRUST, HC, and EXPE can be taken as the elasticity.  Moreover, the 
their respective cross terms, Ln(TRUST)it* Ln(EXPE)it , Ln(HC)it*Ln(EXPE)it, are 
                                                   
20 Firm performance could not be estimated using the production function since the 
input and capital data could not be obtained.   
21 Banerjee and Munshi (2004) pointed out the problem of firm experience being subject 
to a cohort effect, suggesting that it is controlled for by firm fixed effects. 
22 Firm size is measured by the sales revenue deflated by the price index of garment 
products, which is available from the Bank of Japan (1970-2006). 
23 Years of manager experience were measured by the years that had passed since the 
present manager become manager.  Most of these present managers did not coincide 
with the founding managers since the present managers were often the sons of former 
mangers.  This means that manager experience is different from the total years of 
operation of firms. 
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included to assess the influences of social trust (local capital) and human capital (global 
capital) on the learning effect24.  In addition, these interaction effects are thought to 
change over time during the long-term development process of the Kojima region 
garment cluster.  In response to these changes, the signs and absolute value of each 
coefficient are thus expected to change.  To capture these changes in interaction terms, 
I added the interaction terms as additional interactions with the developing stage 
dummy, represented as Y6878, which takes a value of 1 if the year value is 1968 or 1978, 
otherwise it takes a value of 0.  They are represented as Ln(TRUST)it* 
Ln(EXPE)it*Y6878 and Ln(HC)it*Ln(EXPE)it, *Y6878.  
      From Hypotheses 1 and 2, and working from the simple theoretical model 
presented in Section 2, I derive the following predicted signs of each interaction term:   
social trust (local capital) is predicted to improve the learning effects through 
experience in the developing stage, whereas it is will hamper the learning effects in the 
developing stage due the changes in the economic environment.  Accordingly, compared 
with the developed stage, social trust convincingly makes a contribution to firm 
performance in the developing stage.  The coefficient of Ln(TRUST)it* Ln(EXPE)it 
*Y6878 is thus expected to take a positive sign.  In contrast, human capital (global 
capital) is predicted to impede learning effects through experience in the developing 
stage, whereas it will raise the learning effects in the developed stage.  Therefore, 
compared with the developing stage, human capital makes a contribution to firm 
performance in the developed stage.  As predicted theoretically, the sign of Ln(HC)it* 
Ln(EXPE)it *Y6878 turns out to be negative.              
       With respect to the expected signs derived from the field research, in the 
developing stage, improvement of firm performance is regarded as the outcome of the 
production rates within the Kojima region, denoted as CLUSTERit, due to the 
agglomeration economies stemming from the abundance of skilled labor, division of 
labor and especially the economization of transaction cost.  The subcontract network 
within a tightly knitted community is regarded as relatively more effective in improving 
firm performance than internal production, which is represented as INTERit25.  After 
entering the developed stage, however, internal production becomes more important 
than the subcontract network in maintaining high performance because of the 
                                                   
24 Yamauchi (2004) also incorporated the schooling interacted with the experience to 
examine whether schooling and experience is complementary when wage equation is 
estimated.  Banerjee and Munshi (2004) use the interaction term of experience and the 
manager home town dummy as an independent variable. 
25 As is presented in Table 2, both CLUSTER and INTER varied from 0 to 100 and 
therefore it is impossible to take log form. 
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relocation of production bases to the outside of the Kojima region as well as the 
changing demand for product variety and high quality fashionable clothes.  Taken 
together, these lead to the predictions that CLUSTERit *Y6878 and INTERit *Y6878 
take positive and negative signs, respectively. 
 
4.2. Estimation results  
Before examining the statistical results, it is useful to first look at the basic 
statistics shown in Table 2.  The wide variations in most variables, such as FSIZE, 
TRUST, EXPE, CLUSTER and INTER indicate that the features of the firms used as 
the sample are rich in diversity; this indirectly implies that the sampling is nearly 
random.   
To begin with, the results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3.  
The results of a Hausman test, which is concerned with the null-hypothesis that there is 
a systematic difference between the fixed and random effects estimators, is presented in 
the second row from the bottom.  „Yes‟ suggests that there is no systematic difference 
between the models.  This means that the random effects model can be justified in all 
cases and therefore is employed instead of the fixed effects model.  The results of the 
cross terms of Ln(TRUST)it* Ln(EXPE)it and Ln(HC)it* Ln(EXPE)it presented in all 
columns take negative and positive signs, respectively, while being statistically 
significant. This means that social trust hampers the learning effect, whereas human 
capital ameliorates it. The coefficients of Ln(TRUST)it* Ln(EXPE)it in absolute values 
ranging between 0.35 and 0.46 are smaller than those of Ln(HC)it* Ln(EXPE)it, which 
range from 0.58 to 0.69.  The positive influence of Ln(HC)it on learning turned out to 
outweigh the negative influence of social trust, which shows, to a larger extent, the 
importance of human capital in improving firm performance through learning effects.  
With respect to the cross terms with the developing stage dummy, Ln(TRUST)it* 
Ln(EXPE)it *Y6878 and Ln(HC)it* Ln(EXPE)it *Y6878, in columns (2), (5) and (6) take 
significant positive and negative signs, respectively.  I interpret this result as follows:  
The studied period ranging from 1968 to 2005 seems to belong to the developed stage as 
a whole from a historical point of view.  More precisely, however, the period from 
1968-1978 appears to belong to the end of the developing stage, in which social trust 
(local capital) played a relatively important role in the improvement of firm 
performance.  This may have been because, as shown in Figure 2, the rates of 
production within the Kojima region in the period from 1968-1978 are distinctly higher 
than those of the period from 1988-2005.  Thus, the results of estimations concerning 
social trust (local capital) and human capital (global capital) are consistent with 
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Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
As for CLUSTER and INTER in Table 3, all the signs of CLUSTER are positive, 
while all the signs of INTER are negative; further, all were statistically significant.  
This implies that a firm with a higher rate of production within the Kojima region is 
more likely to be small.  On the other hand, a high rate of internal production leads is 
associated with a large firm.  I derive from these observations the argument that a 
firm that produces its products in a lower wage area than Kojima and uses internal 
production to economize transaction costs tends to ameliorate its performance.  
Accordingly, agglomeration economies that stemmed from the use of subcontractors 
disappeared due to the drastic change in economic circumstances.  As presented in 
columns (4) and (6), these variables interacted with the developing stage dummy, that is, 
CLUSTER*Y6878 and INTER*Y6878, taking positive and negative signs, respectively, 
with the signs of CLUSTER*Y6878 being statistically significant but those of 
INTER*Y6878 being insignificant.  It follows that firms relatively benefited from the 
agglomeration economies and flexible production of subcontract networks in the 
developing stage, a conclusion that appears to be congruent with my expected results 
derived from the historical overview of the Kojima region. 
The choice of location of production and production internalization seems also to 
be taken as an outcome of firm performance.  If this is the case, the causality among 
them becomes ambiguous, resulting in estimation bias.  Here it is necessary to deal 
carefully with this bias.  To this end, the findings are subjected to random effect 
estimation for more careful scrutiny using the instrumental variable strategy.   The 
estimation results of the EC2SLS random effects model, which allows me to control for 
endogeneity bias, are shown in Table 4 (Baltagi 1995).  The instruments of INTER and 
CLUSTER, regarded as endogenous variables, are the outsider manager dummy, which 
takes 1 if a manager‟s home town is not Kojima and otherwise 0, and the non-log values 
of TRUST, HC, and EXPE.  A manager‟s home town is determined exogenously in the 
distant past and has a significant effect upon the location of production and rates of 
internal production, as discussed in the previous section.  This is why the outsider 
dummy is an adequate instrument.  Table 4 shows that the same pattern obtained in 
Table 3 continues to be obtained.  
The signs of Ln(TRUST)it* Ln(EXPE)it and Ln(HC)it* Ln(EXPE)it are unchanged 
and their coefficients become larger and more significant, with the exception of 
column(4), when the alternative estimation is employed.  Further, the firm size 
continues to become more elastic with respect to Ln(HC)it* Ln(EXPE)it than to 
Ln(TRUST)it* Ln(EXPE)it.  In addition, the cross terms of these variables and the 
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developing stage dummy, Ln(TRUST)it* Ln(EXPE)it *Y6878 and Ln(HC)it* Ln(EXPE)it 
*Y6878 also continue to take positive and negative signs, despite being statistically 
insignificant in column (3).  These results in Table 4 are consistent with those of Table 
3.  The signs of CLUSTER and INTER are the same as those presented in Table 3.  
However, the fact that the results of CLUSTER are not statistically significant with 
the exception of column(4) is different from Table 4, meaning that production within 
the Kojima region did not hamper firm performance.  It can plausibly be asserted that 
skilled labor and prompt responses are substantially important for Kojima firms due to 
the consumer-driven features of clothes.  This might be why production located in the 
Kojima region does not have a detrimental effect upon firm performance.  As for 
CLUSTER*Y6878 and INTER*Y6878, these coefficient signs do not change despite 
being statistically insignificant.   
     Up to this point we have presented various estimated results.  In sum, we 
arrive at the conclusion that taken together, the estimation results examined in this 
section are both consistent with and support reasonably well Hypotheses 1 and 2, put 
forward in the preceding section.  Moreover, I found that these results are in line with 
the dynamics of location choice and production systems over time.     
 
5. Conclusion 
It is often pointed out, and indeed widely acknowledged, that both social trust, 
comprised of local capital formed through long-term intensive human relationships, and 
human capital, comprised of the global capital accumulated by school education, are 
considered to cause economic development.  However, validity of the former is limited 
to within a tightly knit group such as a community, whereas the role played by the 
latter is generally effective.  On the other hand, learning based on experience, which 
tends to update one‟s expectations and thereby improve the precision of decision making, 
seems to also make a contribution to economic development.  The relative importance 
of these factors appears to change in response to the transition of economic 
circumstances.  Nevertheless, such a dynamic process has yet to be fully explored.  In 
addition, little is known about how the associations among them evolve and change over 
time in the long term.  This research uses panel data of the Japanese garment cluster 
at the firm level to investigate how the influences of social trust and human capital on 
learning effects changed over time in response to drastic environmental changes in the 
garment industry, in which production bases were shifted from the central cluster to the 
outside.    
The results of regression estimations, after controlling for unobserved firm-specific 
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effects, were as follows: 
(1) In the developing stage, the manager of a firm makes decisions and learns from 
their outcomes under conditions constrained by local rules, which are regarded as the 
social norms.  In such a situation, social trust was found to improve the learning effect.  
That is, social trust and learning is complementary.   
(2) In the developed stage, in which an ideal market emerges, a manager ‟s decision 
making is not constrained by local rules.  Due to environment changes, human capital 
accumulated through school education improves the learning effect, while social trust 
comes to have a detrimental effect on leaning.  Put differently, the association of social 
trust and learning becomes substitute, and that of human capital and learning becomes 
complementary.  
The argument can be derived from what I have suggested thus far that economic 
development entails institutional change partly due to the geographical extension of 
place in which business and production are conducted.  Such institutional changes 
cause the effects of social trust and human capital on learning to become altered. 
The present research was limited to a particular area, and the range of ages and 
sample size of the subjects used in the analyses was very small.  As such, the findings 
provided so far can not be generalized to a large degree.  In order to better verify the 
generality of the arguments presented here, additional research, such as a comparable 
study using a larger sample size, should be conducted.   
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Figure 1. Location of the Kojima garment cluster in Okayama prefecture 
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Figure 2. Proportion of sales revenue generated by Kojima area (%) 
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Figure 3. Proportion of sales revenue by internal production (%) 
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Table 1 Rates of Kojima production and internal production (%) 
          Kojima   Internal 
 Native Outsider  Native Outsider 
1968-78   59.7 
  (46) 
49.7 
(20) 
   58.6 
  (46) 
64.7 
(20) 
1988-2005    34.3 
(84) 
   35.2 
  (20) 
   49.8 
(84) 
   37.9 
  (20) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are observations. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition Mean Max Min Standard 
deviation 
FSIZE Sales revenue a) 
 
245 3,110  6 438 
TRUST Years of operation 
 
43 94  3  19 
HC Manager‟s years of education 
 
13 16  6 3 
EXPE Manager‟s years of experience 
 
17 55  1 12 
CLUSTER 
 
Proportion of sales revenue by  
Kojima district 
43 100  0 33 
INTER Proportion of sales revenue by 
internal production 
52 100  0 32 
Notes: a) millions of yen. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of sales revenue (Random Effects Model) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Ln(TRUST) 4.22** 
(2.36) 
4.18** 
(2.35) 
3.56* 
(2.03) 
3.70* 
(2.09) 
3.40* 
(1.91) 
3.80* 
(2.20) 
Ln(HC) 2.28 
(1.01) 
2.70 
(1.18) 
1.13 
(0.51) 
1.22 
(0.55) 
1.26 
(0.56) 
1.93 
(0.86) 
Ln(EXPE) -0.20 
(-0.23) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.26 
(-0.30) 
-0.19 
(-0.22) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(-0.03) 
Ln(TRUST)*  
  Ln(EXPE) 
-0.35* 
(-2.01) 
-0.46* 
(-2.36) 
-0.36* 
(-2.18) 
-0.38* 
(-2.22) 
-0.46** 
(-2.39) 
-0.46** 
(-2.43) 
Ln(HC)*  
 Ln(EXPE) 
0.58* 
(1.83) 
0.66* 
(2.07) 
0.63* 
(2.05) 
0.62* 
(2.01) 
0.68* 
(2.16) 
0.69* 
(2.25) 
Ln(TRUST)*  
 Ln(HC) 
-1.18* 
(-1.92) 
-1.19* 
(-1.94) 
-0.91 
(-1.54) 
-0.94 
(-1.56) 
-0.87 
(-1.42) 
-1.05* 
(-1.74) 
Ln(TRUST)*  
Ln(EXPE)*Y6878 
 0.24** 
(2.33) 
  0.18* 
(1.74) 
0.22* 
(2.15) 
Ln(HC)*  
Ln(EXPE)*Y6878 
 -0.36** 
(-2.34) 
  -0.28* 
(-1.82) 
-0.32* 
(-2.12) 
Ln(TRUST)*  
 Ln(HC) *Y6878 
 0.005 
(0.12) 
  0.01 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
CLUSTER 
 
  -0.008** 
(3.17) 
-0.01** 
(3.60) 
-0.008** 
(3.12) 
-0.01** 
(3.52) 
INTER 
 
  0.006** 
(2.72) 
0.007** 
(2.65) 
0.006** 
(2.38) 
0.006* 
(2.10) 
CLUSTER *Y6878 
 
   0.006* 
(1.90) 
 0.008* 
(2.11) 
INTER *Y6878 
 
   -0.004 
(-1.50) 
 -0.004 
(-0.94) 
Hausman 
test 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Breusch-Pagan  
    test 
0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.13 
Sample 140 140 140 140 140 140 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 
percent levels, respectively (one-sided tests).  In each of the estimates, year dummies 
are included but not reported to save space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
Table 4 
Determinants of sales revenue (EC 2SLS Random Effects Model) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Ln(TRUST) 5.16* 
(2.31) 
4.96** 
(2.47) 
4.69* 
(2.24) 
4.62* 
(2.26) 
Ln(HC) 2.51 
(0.89) 
2.67 
(1.07) 
2.60 
(0.96) 
3.71 
(1.38) 
Ln(EXPE) -0.03 
(-0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.004 
(-0.00) 
Ln(TRUST)*  
  Ln(EXPE) 
-0.47** 
(-2.57) 
-0.45** 
(-2.55) 
-0.52** 
(-2.55) 
-0.43* 
(-2.14) 
Ln(HC)*  
 Ln(EXPE) 
0.70* 
(2.20) 
0.65* 
(2.13) 
0.71* 
(2.25) 
0.64* 
(1.99) 
Ln(TRUST)*  
 Ln(HC) 
-1.36* 
(-1.82) 
-1.36* 
(-2.02) 
-1.29* 
(-1.78) 
-1.46* 
(-2.06) 
Ln(TRUST)*  
Ln(EXPE)*Y6878 
  0.16 
(1.50) 
0.27** 
(2.32) 
Ln(HC)*  
Ln(EXPE)*Y6878 
  -0.26 
(-1.60) 
-0.41** 
(-2.42) 
Ln(TRUST)*  
 Ln(HC) *Y6878 
  -0.003 
(-0.09) 
-0.17* 
(-1.90) 
CLUSTER 
 
-0.007 
(-0.83) 
-0.009 
(-1.28) 
-0.004 
(-0.66) 
-0.01** 
(2.49) 
INTER 
 
0.01** 
(2.54) 
0.01* 
(1.66) 
0.01* 
(2.01) 
0.009 
(0.14) 
CLUSTER *Y6878 
 
 0.002 
(0.31) 
 0.01* 
(1.89) 
INTER *Y6878 
 
 -0.002 
(-0.32) 
 0.01 
(1.28) 
Sample 140 140 140 140 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 
percent levels, respectively (one-sided tests).  Stranger dummy and non-log value of 
TRUST, HC and EXPE are used as instruments in (1) and (3).  Stranger dummy and 
the non-log values of TRUST, HC and EXPE and their cross terms with Y6878 are used 
as instruments in (2) and (4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
